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Abstract
We examine an intervention randomized at the village level in which female farmers invited to a
single training session were randomly paired with farmers whom they did not know and encour-
aged to share new agricultural information throughout the growing season for a recently adopted
cash crop. We show that the intervention significantly increased the productivity of all farmers
except of those who were already in the highest quintile of productivity, and that there were
significant spillovers in productivity to male farmers.
1 Introduction
Programs aimed at increasing agricultural productivity are regarded as some of the most powerful
means to reduce poverty [Asfaw et al., 2011, Thirtle et al., 2001]. Essential elements in the early
stages of such programs are the dissemination of information from centers of science and research
to subsistence farmers and the subsequent diffusion of this new knowledge within a village.
Thus, the effectiveness of agricultural extension depends not only on the technical merits of a
new technology but on the quality of the interactions between extension agents and the farmers
whom they train, as well as the subsequent interactions between trained and untrained farmers
(Anderson and Feder [2007, pp.2346] and Foster and Rosenzweig [1995]). Despite significant
effort and money devoted to programs that expect a few select individuals who are trained to
disseminate information to the remainder of the village, many studies over the past forty years
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have documented a poor retention of learned information and even poorer diffusion of information
across farmers, exacerbating poverty for the poorest individuals both in terms of productivity
and in social capital [Feder et al., 2004, Leonard, 1977, Sinha and Mehta, 1972]. For example,
Sinha and Mehta [1972] report that farmers who learned about a new innovation passed on
only 28% of what they had learned to the farmers to whom they directly. In contrast, Conley
and Udry [2010] report that Ghanaian pineapple farmers were able to improve yields through
contact with farmers in their own social network, suggesting that diffusion does not necessarily
occur across an entire village network, but is specific to each individual’s own network. Indeed,
belonging to strong social networks is correlated with earlier adoption of innovations and better
outcomes [see Isham, 2002, Munshi, 2004, for example].
Unfortunately, although the poorest farmers frequently stand to benefit the most from new
technologies, they are often outside of the very networks that would allow them to learn about
these innovations. This is particularly true of women, who provide a significant amount of labor
to African agriculture, are responsible for most food crop production, and typically experience
significantly lower yields than men, even for the same crops [Quisumbing, 2003, Udry, 1996,
Udry and Goldstein, 2006]. At the same time, there is evidence that networks of females are
typically less oriented towards cash crops than those of males [Edmeades et al., 2008, Katungi
et al., 2008]. Thus, women may suffer from large “structural holes” in their production networks
[Hoang et al., 2006] and this could explain at least part of their lower productivity. This suggests
that agricultural extension programs could be augmented by attempts to improve the dissemina-
tion of information to women and the subsequent dissemination of information within women’s
production networks.
This study evaluates an extension program that uses female social networks to disseminate
new information in rural Uganda, which we refer to as the Social Network Intervention (SNI).
We exogenously paired farmers in a networking session in which participants were taught new
information. Each woman was paired with another randomly selected female cotton farmer
who she did not already know. Both women were invited to the initial networking session in
which information about better farming techniques was provided. The paired women were given
pictures of each other (Polaroids) and asked to speak to each other throughout the cotton-growing
season.
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In addition to comparing the SNI to the standard counterfactual (no intervention) we also
compare the SNI with a standard extension training model similar to training previously im-
plemented by extension agents in Uganda.1 In the standard training program, women and men
were invited to attend a series of training sessions designed to impart the same information: both
interventions focused on the same list of agricultural information points provided to our team
by local ginners with the idea that these were simple, inexpensive and important techniques for
improving cotton yields.2 Whereas participants in the SNI met once with our team and were
asked to talk with each other after that point, the standard training (TR) disseminated informa-
tion via biweekly visits from a trainer during the five critical stages of the season: pre-planting,
planting, pesticide use, harvesting, and marketing. Due to the possible additive effects of social
networking and training, we randomized the two programs across villages to also include a sam-
ple in which both the SNI and TR were implemented for the same people. We compared our
results to a control group that did not receive any training.
We show that the SNI had a positive impact on overall outcomes. Difference in difference
estimates of cotton yields show that cotton farmers in villages that received the SNI experienced
large gains compared to the control group. A Tobit specification, which accounts for the fact
that many farmers chose not to plant cotton in 2010, shows significant gains from SNI for all
farmers including, independently, both men and women. Similarly, an OLS regression of yields
shows gains for all but the highest performing farmers (namely, those with starting yields greater
than 400 kilograms per hectare, where the average starting yield is 180 kilograms per hectare).
In addition, we show that women paired in the SNI intervention were more likely to talk to each
other after the intervention, that knowledge about farming (as measured by a test administered
in the second round) was higher for women who received the intervention, and that pairing
women with each other increased yields even for women who did not attend the information
sessions. Finally, men, despite not being directly treated, also gained in yields.
Our intervention falls into the purview of network alteration interventions as summarized by
Valente [2012], and this is one of few studies in the development literature that uses a randomized
encouragement design aimed at exogenously changing social networks.3 Recent literature on
1See Baffes and Maratou-Kolias [2013] for details regarding the training program.
2See Appendix B for the list of information points.
3See Mullally et al. [2013] for an overview of randomized encouragement designs in agriculture.
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networks suggests that the structure of a network and the roles of individuals within that network
can have important implications in learning [Bandiera and Rasul, 2006, Bramoulle´ et al., 2014,
Bramoulle` et al., 2009, Bursztyn et al., 2014, Conley and Udry, 2001, 2010, Jackson and Golub,
2012]. Perturbing the network structure is one method of understanding the mechanisms of
learning, particularly when the reflection problem confounds network effects [Manski, 1993].
Field et al. [2013] is another recent study that exogenously perturbs new microfinance groups in
Bangladeshi villages by varying the meeting frequency of these groups to understand the impact
of network effects on loan repayment. BenYishay and Mobarak [2016] also examine information
flows by perturbing village networks in Malawi. They study information diffusion by altering
which member of the network received an incentive to spread information. They find that peer
farmers in Malawi (average village members selected by a local focus group), when provided with
a small incentive, are more effective at promoting adoption than lead farmers (leaders identified
by the same community focus group), or government-employed extension workers.
Where our study, Field et al. [2013], and BenYishay and Mobarak [2016] attempt to alter the
structure of the network, other studies, such as Adelman [2013], Leonard [2007], Duflo and Saez
[2014] and Marmaros and Sacerdote [2002] use natural variation in networks to identify network
effects. Still others use other sources of variation to understand when and how networks can affect
decisions. For example, Breza [2016] uses natural variation in loan repayment incentives to study
the impact of a peer’s repayment on an individual’s timing of payments, and shows evidence of
network effects, and Banerjee et al. [2013] exploit the natural random variation found in the
network centrality of each individual who was initially exposed to their microfinance program to
identify network effects.
Where we differ from other research is in our focus on developing new network ties between
females, specifically, between individuals who do not know each other well but who may have
different sources of valuable information. These nascent and weaker connections may be more
likely to propagate new information [Granovetter, 1974, 2005, Santos and Barrett, 2005] and
may therefore be more useful to individuals (and the network as a whole) than expanding the
raw size of the network. Weak ties may also better incorporate individuals who might otherwise
not be reached by a central individual in a village, or may not be selected for extension training
sessions.
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We believe that our findings have implications for developing more effective and more cost-
effective extension training programs. Extension agents are frequently spread thinly across hun-
dreds of farmers, without the time or resources to address each farmer’s concerns in their ex-
ecution of new farming techniques. Furthermore, the more distant and less skilled farmers are
often not selected for training programs, and may not even receive a second–hand account of a
training session.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides background on the research context
and describes the data collection and randomization. In section 3 we examine the evidence for
improved yields among our sample, focusing on our targeted farmers: women and farmers with
lower yields. Having shown the strong positive impact of the program, we examine some potential
channels through which the intervention may have affected outcomes. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
Although it is likely that networks play important roles in all settings, measuring the value of
a social network is easier when opportunities for learning are high and existing networks are
incomplete. This study’s focus in Uganda is an excellent setting to examine the role of social
networks and learning in farming for a variety of reasons. First, farmers are growing a crop that
was only recently reintroduced. Due to civil war and political unrest, cotton production ceased
under Idi Amin’s regime when the majority of the Indians who managed Uganda’s businesses
were persecuted and expelled. As a result, at least one generation passed in which no transfer of
knowledge occurred for this cash crop. It is precisely in these circumstances, where technologies
are nascent, that social networks and learning should have their greatest impacts.
Second, since the reintroduction of cotton, the government and ginners have tried to im-
prove productivity using various extension services, but none of these education campaigns were
targeted towards women. Baffes [2009] shows that male heads of households’ crop yields are
three to four times those of female heads of households in Uganda. As females supply 70-80%
of agricultural labor in rural Uganda and are responsible for up to 80% of food crop production
[Tanzarn, 2005], low female crop yields are a tremendous loss to national welfare and have been a
subject of significant research in Uganda and developing countries in general [Quisumbing, 2003,
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Udry, 1996, Udry and Goldstein, 2006].
Third, women who grow cotton undoubtedly belong to social networks, but the chances
that their existing networks include optimal numbers of women cotton farmers are low. While
males’ days are delineated by morning work and afternoon discussion with other males, women’s
days are often a simultaneous combination of work, childcare, and household responsibilities.
Women’s wider range of household responsibilities raises the cost and reduces their availability
for acquiring new production techniques. As such, existing female social networks develop pri-
marily around household and childcare responsibilities, and these networks are not the best place
for women to learn about cotton production. Further, female production networks will also be
less oriented around cash crops than those of men [Edmeades et al., 2008, Katungi et al., 2008].
Responsibilities close to the home also restrict females from participating in geographically dis-
persed social networks and community projects, and force their relationships to be dependent on
the collaborative tasks that they perform with other females, such as collecting water and fuel,
and harvesting crops [Maluccio et al., 2003]. Thus, though there are significant opportunities
provided by the government and ginners for farmers to learn about cotton growing, women, in
particular, face numerous obstacles to attending such learning sessions and thereby improve their
productivity and yields.
To investigate the role of networks in cotton farmers’ productivity, we introduced two ran-
domized interventions in cotton farming villages in the North and Northeast of Uganda.4 A
household survey was administered in randomly selected villages in the two major cotton grow-
ing regions of Uganda: North (13 villages) and Northeast (13 villages). The baseline data were
collected from February through May 2009. The second round was collected in March through
May 2010. We interviewed randomly selected households that grew cotton in 2008 stratified
by headship gender.5 The household survey consisted of questions on household demograph-
ics, input use and outputs for cotton and other crops grown, household controls of financial
assets, including sales from cotton, and a separate survey instrument on farmers’ social networks
regarding adoption, cultivation, and marketing of cotton.
4This was part of the larger RCT that implemented a cotton training program under “Gender Dimension of Cotton
Productivity in Uganda” led by Laoura Maratou (University of Maryland) and John Baffes (World Bank). For a basic
overview of the interventions see Vasilaky [2013].
5The head of the household was defined as the individual who made land, resource and income allocation decisions
in the household.
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In order to compare two different methods of transmitting the same information, we dissem-
inated the same information about cotton growing through two different interventions, testing
each separately as well as combining the two. To do this, we randomly assigned these treatments
by village. By randomizing the SNI and TR programs across villages, we were able to measure
the effects of the SNI treatment and the TR treatment, and the complementary effects of both
treatments against a control group. The SNI was targeted to all female cotton farmers who were
surveyed in SNI villages, and the TR was targeted to all surveyed farmers (men and women) in
TR villages. We first randomly selected villages from a list of cotton growing villages in Oyam
District and Mbale District. Among those villages, we randomly assigned SNI and TR treat-
ments. A total of 13 villages received SNI, and 17 villages received TR. Table 1 represents the
sample sizes across the two treatments. While only some villages were selected to receive one of
the two programs, every village in our sample was visited by our team. Therefore, the effects
from our results cannot be attributed purely to a behavioral response to our visits.
Finally, in each village we conducted a census of all female and male cotton growers.6 We
then randomly selected 7 female and 7 male farmers to be surveyed in two crop years. Therefore,
approximately an equal number of male heads and female heads of households participated in
the study. In villages that received the TR intervention, all households selected for the survey
were invited to training sessions conducted by a local agronomist for five training stages in 2009:
pre-planting in March through April; planting in May; pesticide use in July through August;
harvesting in October through November; and marketing in December and January. All farmers
in the village were invited to the training sessions, and care was taken to make sure that female
participation was encouraged and welcomed. We know from the logs of these sessions that women
did attend, but not every invited farmer attended every session.
In villages that received the SNI, the 7 surveyed female farmers and an additional 7 female
farmers were invited to one information training session.7 The intention was to incorporate
a greater number of females in the study, beyond those who were surveyed, and increase the
number of individuals participating in the game information sessions. This training consisted of
teaching farmers precisely the same facts provided in the training session, and enumerated in
6All farmers on the census list were farmers who had harvested cotton in the previous season.
7Note that the 7 additional farmers were not surveyed in the larger study.
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the Appendix, but in a less repetitive fashion where the teaching was spread among all female
participants. At the conclusion of the session, women were paired with another woman trained
during the same session. The goal of these two stages was to add a new network link for each
woman, and to increase the reach of the training information.
The pairing was achieved by first stratifying the cotton-growing participants into distinct
geographic areas of the village,8 and then randomly pairing individuals within these areas.9
Following this initial pairing, we inquired if the pairs spoke to one another regarding cotton
issues.10 We re-selected a pair if the individuals spoke to each other about production or if both
were to receive training in training villages. Thus, in villages that received both the SNI and
the training intervention, each pair consisted of at least one female who was invited to receive
training and one female who was not invited to receive training. Each pair received a Polaroid
photo of themselves and their partner, identified cultivation issues, chose a collaborative goal,
and set potential times when they would meet to exchange information. They then presented
this to their peers at the group information meeting. In this way, they were strongly encouraged
to build a relationship to discuss cotton growing. Individual participants appeared to take the
pairing exercise seriously, despite not being given any incentives to attend our meetings or to
continue speaking with one another during the season.
To measure the impact of the intervention we look at unbiased estimates of the intention-
to-treat (ITT), which includes cultivators as well as non-cultivators.11 We then investigate
the treatment-on-the-treated (TOT), which includes cultivators only. Table 2 reports summary
statistics of our farmers’, including their average yield. The average Ugandan cotton farmer in
our sample produces between 100 and 200 kilograms per year.12 Standard deviations for the yield
8This was to ensure that females were sufficiently distant from one another such that they most likely did not speak
to one another on production issues, but also were not separated by large geographic constraints.
9We used numbers randomly drawn from a uniform distribution, U [0, x], where x represents the number of individ-
uals in the group. We would then pair individual “1” with the first listed number on the list of numbers drawn from
U[0,14]. If the first number was “1” then we would select the next number in the list, perhaps “3”. Now “1” and “3”
would be paired, “3” would be crossed out, and we would continue down the list in this way until all 14 women were
paired.
10In only 2 instances did this occur, and we then re-paired individuals to ensure that all pairs had not spoken to
one another about production issues.
11For the purposes of first estimating the ITT, Bulte et al. [2014, footnote 21] assign a zero yield to even those
farmers who have not planted. Similar research also provides the ITT as a first step of estimating program impacts in
randomized agricultural programs studying yield outcomes [BenYishay and Mobarak, 2016, Kondylis et al., 2014].
12One kilogram of seed cotton yields 0.30 kilograms of cotton lint—which could produce one to two t-shirts, for
example—and return 30-40 US cents (600-900 shillings per kilogram) to a Ugandan farmer. Seed cotton refers to the
harvested cotton lint and seed, where the seeds have not been filtered from the lint. Cotton seed refers to the actual
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of cotton (kilograms per acre) and level of cotton (total kilograms produced) are particularly
high. The number of acres used to grow cotton is between one-half and one acre on average.
Though land is not seen as scarce, the labor required to clear and prepare the land renders yield
per acre a more accurate measure of productivity than total production. Also of note is that
average output per kilogram of seed was 52 kilograms in 2009 and fell to 37 kilograms in 2010.
In 2010, both the Northern and Eastern parts of Uganda suffered from rain deficits in both
treatment and control areas [Namara and Bitekerezo, 2010].
Before estimating the effects of the intervention, we also check that our treatment assignment
is balanced. F-statistics in Table 3 show the joint test of whether the effects of treatment
assignment are different from zero. We do observe some imbalance. We can see that for the overall
sample age and education differ from the control at 10% significance. Table 4 shows the balance
for females only. For females who received the SNI treatment we see that age is not imbalanced,
while education and inputs, including used acreage and pesticides are not statistically different
across all three treatment groups at 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. A difference in
difference framework will difference out any constant imbalances along observables, and we also
confirm that our conclusions are largely unchanged after controlling for the latter variables in
section 3.
3 Estimation
Our intervention is motivated by the standard target-input learning model [Foster and Rosen-
zweig, 1995, Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996], but with the understanding that weak network links
might provide important information for growing cotton. In the standard version of the model,
households can learn by doing (learning from their own experiences) as well as from the experi-
ences of others in their community. The speed with which households learn will depend on the
number of people from whom they can learn as well as the fidelity of the signals they observe.
We consider the possibility that distant links, though suffering from reduced fidelity in trans-
mission, might provide essential additional information because the signals are less likely to be
correlated with the farmer’s own signal.13 In other words, a farmer’s immediate neighbor’s plot
seeds that the cotton plant produces.
13See Appendix C for a formal exposition of the model.
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might provide a precise signal about the optimal level of inputs that is virtually identical to the
farmer’s own signal, and, is therefore, not very informative.
On the other hand, information from a more distant farmer may be less precise but provide
more independent information. Take for example, a pest infestation. Farmers need to decide
when to apply pesticides after observing pests: should they apply them at first sight of a pest,
or wait to see if the infestation worsens? Since pest infestations spillover to neighboring farms,
when a farmer observes yields following a timing choice, she needs to take into account the fact
that her own yield depends on her neighbors’ choices and that her neighbors’ yields depend on
her choice. Thus, she may collect precise but not independent signals. On the other hand, the
choices and results from distant farmers may provide more information about optimal timing,
because there are no spillovers.
This intervention was not directly designed to increase the size of a woman’s network, but to
improve the quality of learning in the network by adding (or improving) a different kind of link.
We asked women to communicate more with another specific woman chosen from a different
area of the village and with whom they did not previously exchange information about cotton
farming. The pairing is easiest to understand as an increase in the fidelity for an existing link
with greater independence of signals. This type of intervention is likely to be beneficial to women
because women’s networks have been shown to be geographically limited [Katungi et al., 2008].
Additionally, we have specifically chosen to test this implication in a setting where accumulated
learning levels are low, women tend to have low quality production networks to begin with,
and low levels of education and previous extension outreach suggest that the precision of initial
guesses about timing are low.
Importantly, we can verify that the pairings we encouraged were between farmers who did
not previously observe one other’s input decisions. We look at whether individuals in the SNI
intervention mentioned the person to whom they were assigned in the social network survey.
First, we ensure that no participants mentioned speaking to their pair in the 2009 baseline survey,
confirming our strategy of forming new, weak network links with the pairings. Examining the
list of new names added in 2010, we find that 26% of our SNI participants specifically mentioned
their pair, suggesting that the SNI pairings did create new links.14
14Women in the control villages added, on average, two and a half new names to their rosters in the second year.
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We test these hypotheses using the following reduced form regression:
qt(SN, TR) = α0 + α1SNI + α2TR+ α3SNI · TR+ β0 · t (1)
+β1SNI · t+ β2TR · t+ β3SNI · TR · t+ u
The estimated βˆ1 captures the average treatment effect (ATE) of the SNI on yields, namely the
effect of SNI across time, or SNI · t where:
βˆ1 = [E(y|SNI = 1, t = 1, TR = 0)− E(y|SNI = 1, t = 0, TR = 0)]−
[E(q|SNI = 0, t = 1, TR = 0)− E(q|SNI = 0, t = 0, TR = 0)] (2)
βˆ2 captures the effect of TR on yields and βˆ3 captures the effect of the combined programs as
separate from the summed effects (across time). We expect both β1 and β2 to be greater than 0.
We measure the impact of the SNI both by looking at the overall gain in yields for women
and men and looking at the degree to which the intervention encouraged women to continue
planting cotton.15
3.1 Cotton Yields
We first estimate the reduced form effect of SNI and TR on cotton yields (Equation 2) in a
difference in difference framework. Yields are defined as the total output divided by intended
acreage. An ordinary least squares approach provides unbiased and interpretable estimates of
the intent to treat. The outcome variable, yield, represents the kilograms of cotton seed output
per acre.16 We are interested in the coefficients on SNI · t, and SNI · TR · t: that is, the pure
impact of the SNI on outcomes, and the interaction effect of SNI and TR. Note that we also check
that the estimated coefficients on SNI, TR and SNI · TR are insignificant, demonstrating the
However, given that an average of 96 individual names were mentioned across all surveys within a village, there is only
a 3% probability of selecting one individual name in a random process with two and a half draws out of sample of 96.
Thus, the finding that 26% of households mentioned their pair is notably different from what we would expect from a
random process.
15In all of the regressions below, standard errors are clustered at the village level, as well as using a cluster wild
bootstrap in Appendix A [Cameron et al., 2008, 2011].
16Table 13 presents the main estimates using wild bootstrapped standard errors, and Table 14 presents the main
results using a panel structure with fixed effects. Neither change the interpretation of our results.
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validity of the random selection. Similarly, the t variable measures whether there is a significant
time trend in yields, which we expect to be negative given the adverse weather events (drought)
in 2010. The estimated impacts of SNI · t and of SNI · TR · t on total yield (Column 1) are
insignificant. The impact of receiving both the SNI and TR is the sum total of β1, β2, and β3.
β3 is not statistically different from zero suggesting that the effects are not substitutes, which is
likely if the two interventions are effective for different groups.
Yields in this sample are right skewed and most producers, before and after the treatments,
produce less than 400 kilograms per acre. According to standard models of learning, we should
not expect a significant impact from SNI or TR for those who are already productive because of
previous learning. Column 2 of Table 5 estimates Equation 2, conditional on having grown 400
kilograms of cotton per acre or less in 2009 (which excludes the top 11% of our original sample).
Columns 3 and 4 show the same sample divided into male- and female-headed households.17
The SNI treatment has a positive and significant impact on households who harvested less
than 400 kilograms of cotton in 2009 as shown in Column 2. On average, females in the SNI
treatment gained a total of 98 kilograms per acre (Column 3), while men living in SNI villages
gained 70 kilograms per acre (Column 4), conditional on their starting yields. The effects of
the training program are comparable at 72 kilograms per acre for females (and this effect is not
statistically different from the average SNI effect, p value= 0.7). Considering that the average
yield across 2009 and 2010 was 160 kilograms per acre, the gains from SNI are economically
significant for both men and women. The interaction effect between SNI and TR is negative
(though not significant), indicating that the joint effect of the SNI and TR is less than the sum
of each intervention’s independent effect. This is not surprising given that SNI and TR introduce
the same information, but using different dissemination methodologies. Note that, because 2010
was a bad year compared to 2009, most of the gains we observe from the two interventions are
actually avoided losses, rather than net gains.
We next estimate a Tobit model to account for the underlying right skewed distribution,
17Note that despite the SNI being a randomly assigned program, in 2009, women who were selected for the SNI
happened to be worse off than those who were not. It is not surprising that, as we continue to subdivide our sample
(in this case, women with less than 400 kg production in the first period), we will find small groups that are not
balanced—this result does not mean that the randomization is invalid. Importantly, however, this baseline difference
is controlled for by using a difference-in-difference framework in Table 12 and Table 11, and does not change our main
results.
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where a zero is considered the result of a latent process which is itself driven by our treatments.
Table 5 exhibits the results in Columns 5-8. The results are significant and larger than the OLS
estimates in Columns 1-4, and provide additional support that the SNI had a positive effect on
farmers’ outcomes.18
Finally, we also look at the effect of the intervention on inputs in Table 6.19 Inputs for
the overall sample did not change for this period, including for females alone. Seed, land and
pesticide use remained constant while yields increased, suggesting that practices beyond inputs
increased yields for females.
3.2 Growing and Harvesting Cotton
As noted earlier, the respondents in our sample experienced a drought in 2010. Almost everyone’s
yields declined between 2009 and 2010, as noted by the Table 2. A number of farmers experienced
zero yields, and both the SNI and TR prevented overall declines as compared to the control group.
In 2009, within our full sample of male and females farmers, 6 households experienced no output.
By 2010, 136 households experience zero yields – 90 of them did not plant, and 46 grew, but had
zero yields.
One possible impact of the intervention is that it encouraged farmers to continue planting
cotton. To test this, we look at the impact of the SNI and TR on farmers’ decisions to grow
cotton. Table 7 estimates the effect of the SNI and TR on remaining a cotton grower between
2009 and 2010, despite the adverse weather shocks mentioned earlier. We use a probit model to
predict the probability that a grower continues to grow cotton where the outcome variable is 0
if the individual ceased to grow cotton in 2010, and equals 1 if they planted cotton. Column 1
indicates that the presence of the SNI in a village positively and significantly impacted a farmer’s
decision to continue to grow cotton. The marginal effect of the program at mean values is an
18% increase in the probability of remaining a cotton grower. Training a farmer increased the
probability of remaining a cotton grower by 11% but is statistically insignificant. For females,
the increase is greater, where the SNI increased the probability of remaining a cotton grower by
38% and 25% for training. Although we cannot reject the hypothesis that TR and SNI have the
18In this specification females experienced a smaller increase in yields relative males, but the difference is not
statistically significant (p value = 0.36).
19Table 15 presents the same estimates using wild bootstrapped standard errors.
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same impact, we can reject the hypothesis that female farmers in SNI villages are as likely to
plant as female farmers in control villages.
Since both training and the social network intervention increased the probability that a
woman would grow cotton in the subsequent year a natural next step is to evaluate whether
yields improved conditional on cultivation. That is, conditional on growing cotton, did women
in TR or SNI villages exhibit lower or higher yields than women in control villages? Conversely,
it is possible that not only did the treatments encourage women to grow cotton, but they also
made them better cultivators than those farmers in control villages who continued to grow (and
may be likely to have been among the better farmers). To test the similarity of the distributions
across treatments for those who planted cotton in 2010, in Table 8 we use a probit to look at
the effect of SNI on the probability of a positive harvest in 2010 restricting the sample to only
those farmers who chose to grow cotton in 2010. In Column 1, we see that in this sample, the
SNI has a significant effect for the overall sample and for men alone. However, when we reduce
the sample to females who had yields less than 400 in the baseline, the effects, though positive,
are not significant.
Examining the case of women who had yields below 400 kg per acre in 2009, we learn about
the relative size of the intensive and extensive margin effects. Women who received only the
SNI treatment were 38.5 percentage points more likely to plant cotton than women in control
villages. Since the average yield for all such women who planted cotton in 2010 was 147 kg per
acre, this would suggest that examining only the extensive margin, SNI should have increased
the average yield by 0.38*147 or 57 kg per acre. Comparing this to the estimated coefficient
of 98 kg per acre (see Table 5), the intensive margin would be about 41 kg per acre. However,
98 kg per acre is not statistically different from 57 kg per acre, so the estimate of the intensive
margin is not significantly different from zero.
If we consider women who received SNI and also received training, we find they are about
43 percentage points more likely to plant and experience a gain of about 120 kg/acre (based on
the estimated coefficient). Again, using the overall average of 147 kg/acre, the extensive margin
implies a gain of about 63 kg per acre leaving an intensive margin of about 57 kg per acre. Thus,
having been encouraged by the interventions to plant cotton, women in these villages gained
somewhere between 57 and 63 kg per acre, and being better farmers led to imprecisely estimated
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gains of between 41 and 57 kg per acre. However, we cannot draw any definitive conclusions
from this estimate alone, given its self-selected sample.
Thus, for this subsample, the SNI increased the probability that treated women would choose
to plant cotton and increased the probability that men who did plant would have a positive yield.
In addition, the evidence suggests that women who did plant because of the SNI intervention did
not experience worse outcomes than women who chose to plant in the control villages. Note that
since the decision not to plant is endogenous, we cannot make an identified causal conclusion
about the actions of this sample, however, overall, this estimation suggests that the bulk of the
impact for women is on the extensive margin—the decision to plant—and the impact for men
(despite not directly receiving the treatment) is on the intensive margin—the probability that
they would have a positive harvest conditional on choosing to plant.
3.3 Intervention Costs
The SNI had a significant and positive impact – impacts that are not statistically different from
a standard extension training program. However, the social network intervention is significantly
less expensive than the standard extension training intervention. Typical extension training
programs are costly. Each trainer can only train a handful of farmers at any one time before
quality and reach degrade. In addition, it takes man-hours, transportation and fuel to reach
remote villages.
Thus, one of the primary benefits of the social network intervention is that it required only
two visits from a lead extension trainer with an assistant for each village, whereas the training
intervention required nine visits per village. The overall cost of the traditional training program
was $7,080 USD with each extension trainer leading anywhere from 7-30 farmers each at a given
demonstration on a bi-weekly basis for an approximate cost of $20 USD per farmer for 354 trained
farmers. In comparison, the SNI costed $2,080 for approximately the same number of farmers
– 30% of the cost and a little more than $5 per farmer. Conversely, the overall benefit per acre
to a female farmer, assuming a return of $0.30 per kilogram of seed cotton,20 and the estimated
effect sizes from Table 5, was $29 per acre for the SNI and $21 per acre for the TR. For the
20The Cotton Development Organization announces indicative prices for seed cotton each year. In 2009 and 2010,
the indicative price was 900 Ugandan Shillings [Ahmed and Ojangole, 2012].
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average female farmer with little over half an acre, the SNI remains a cost effective investment,
while the training does not. Note that this analysis assumes no spillovers despite the evidence
that the SNI, in particular, benefitted untreated men as well as treated women.
3.4 Testing the Impact on Knowledge
It is helpful to understand if the intervention improved outcomes through knowledge acquisition
at the information meetings, or potentially through other informal learning outside these meet-
ings. To investiage whether the gains in yields came from the increased knowledge that women
acquired during the meetings, we examine women’s scores on a quiz of cotton-farming knowledge.
As part of the survey in the second round, we gave each farmer a quiz on the information taught
in the initial meetings for the SNI. We then calculated the percentage of correct answers to the 12
questions on the information points taught (see Appendix B). This data can only be analyzed in
a cross-sectional regression, taking advantage of the randomization to identify program impacts.
As a check on our cross-sectional results, we also examined the yield regressions in the same
framework. Given that the assignment of programs is random, the impact of SNI and TR should
not be statistically different whether we use panel or cross-sectional data for the full sample.
Table 9 shows that both the SNI and TR improved the scores of participants by between
4% and 5%, or about half a question. Given that the initial average score was about 40% (4.5
questions correct out of 12), this is not an unimportant improvement. However, it is clearly
not the case that farmers remembered everything that they learned in either the information
session or the training. Using quiz scores over the whole sample from 2010, we estimate that
farmers who scored 10% higher on the test experienced 27 kilograms per acre greater yields (30
kilograms for a restricted sample of women). This suggests that an increase of 5% on the test
would increase yields by around 15 kilograms per acre. In comparison, we estimate that female
yields increased by between 60 and 90 kilograms, suggesting that improved knowledge is directly
responsible for only a small proportion of the gains.
In addition, there is a subset of females who participated in the pairing meetings and the
social network survey who were unable to attend the initial information games. These individuals
were paired but did not directly receive or learn the information taught via the games. Therefore,
we created another treatment variable, information, which assumes a value of 1 if an individual
16
attended the meetings and was paired, and assumes a value of 0 if the individual did not attend
the meetings, but was paired with a new link in the second round. If SNI · t is insignificant after
controlling for information, then we might conclude that the program’s effect is operating via
the information games and not through the pairings. Of course, attendance in the information
meetings was voluntary, and therefore, information is endogenous. Women who attended may
have had lower opportunity cost or greater expected benefit from attending.
Table 10 includes the estimates of the information variable in the panel model for females.
In the OLS specification Information is not a significant contributor to the gains in female
yields while SNI remains significant. This would suggest that attending the information sessions
alone was not the only mechanism by which the SNI improved yields for females. Of course,
this effect may be muted if better farmers experienced less of an improvement on average. Note
that those who attended the meetings were, on average, better farmers before the intervention
than those who missed the meeting. Taken together, the results on quiz scores and attendance
suggest that the meetings may have improved quiz scores, but that this additional knowledge
explains only about 20% to 25% of the gains observed under the treatment.
4 Conclusion
Our research estimates the effects of a social network-based agricultural training program in
which female cotton farmers were given new information and encouraged to form paired links
with other female cotton farmers with whom they had not previously interacted. Our esti-
mated impacts of the SNI are positive and significant for farmers who were producing up to
400 kilograms per acre in 2009, where the average Ugandan farmer produces between 100 and
200 kilograms per acre per year. In particular, the difference in difference estimates of SNI on
yields show that pairing female cotton growers with someone they do not know, as well as pro-
viding pairs with new knowledge to share, increased yields by 98 kilograms per acre on average
for females. Furthermore, while the SNI had its greatest impact on females’ yields, it also had
positive spillover effects for males. This simple intervention achieves results that are similar to
those achieved with more conventional methods of transmitting information, with benefits to
those who are not directly targeted.
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Several mechanisms may have contributed to the effectiveness of the SNI; however, future
research is necessary to determine the specific mechanisms at play. We consider the direct effects
of the intervention–new links and new knowledge. The evidence suggests that the encouragement
of new links with other farmers was successful; we saw an increase in the number of new rela-
tionships discussing cotton production issues, particularly between women who were exogenously
paired. On the intensive margin, productivity increased overall, and for males alone. However,
estimates are less precise for females. The fact that men were never encouraged to form new
links but increased their yields suggests that improvements in knowledge within their existing
networks could have helped. For women, we find that the SNI expanded participants’ agricul-
tural knowledge (as seen on tests), and these gains can account for about 20% of the increase in
farmers’ yields. It is likely that the majority of improvements for females came from the pairing
of females to other women who had new sources of information. This may have encouraged
female farmers to grow the cash crop, but also enabled them to perform as well as their average
peer, even during a difficult year.
Taken together, our research shows that there are large gains from a development approach
that encourages the use of social networks in the presence of new information to improve yields
for female farmers. With our approach, low-cost agricultural training is possible without a top-
down training structure, and it can be more effective at improving outcomes for the poorest
farmers, who are very often females. This research is particularly relevant for extension services
in Uganda, the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), which is becoming more
decentralized, encouraging multiple providers and methodologies for extension services, with the
aim to address the specific inequalities present at a village level [Kahubire, 2005, Lungahi and
Opira, 2013]. NAADS has already moved away from direct visitation to group based visits,
mainly because direct visitation was not found to have a significant impact on outcomes [Benin
et al., 2011]. Further, NAADS has implicitly focused on larger male-headed households. As such,
our approach provides a tested methodology for incorporating a very decentralized process into
extension services. As women are effectively excluded from higher quality agricultural networks
and have fewer opportunities to learn about better farming practices, this method can help
overcome this training gap. Further, the SNI program also has positive impact for males as well.
These results point to a number of directions for future work, including developing a greater
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understanding of whether new, weak network connections facilitate information exchange, whether
information transmission via such connections is sustainable, and whether this methodology ex-
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Table 1: Treatment Sample Size
(No. of Villages in Parentheses)
(1) (2) (3)
TR No TR Totals
SNI 96 59 155
(8) (5) (13)
No SNI 120 50 170
(9) (5) (14)
Totals 216 109 325
(17) (10) (27)
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Table 2: Means of Main Variables in 2009 & 2010
(1) (2) (3)
2009 2010 Average 2009 & 2010
Social Network 0.48 0.48 0.48
Intervention (SNI) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Training 0.66 0.66 0.66
Intervention (TR) (0.474) (0.475) (0.474)
Gender (Fem=1) 0.48 0.48 0.48
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Education (Yrs) 5.6 5.9 5.7
(2.9) (2.9) (2.9)
Kg Cotton 140.8 79.54 109.9
(201.5) (129.2) (171.6)
Acres 0.983 0.586 0.783
(0.701) (0.593) (0.678)
Yield (Kg/Acre) 182.0 139.5 160.6
(208.7) (234.9) (223.1)
Kg Seed 4.976 3.232 4.097
(3.799) (3.000) (3.527)
Yield Per 52.83 36.96 44.83
Seed (78.32) (62.70) (71.27)
Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 3: Balanced Panel Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES fertilizer age education yield used acreage pesticide seed
SNI 0.159 1.756 1.133 58.85 -0.355 -0.0165 0.198
(0.548) (0.460) (0.115) (0.129) (0.101) (0.939) (0.841)
TRAINING -0.0820 0.325 0.327 26.98 -0.260 1.583 -0.253
(0.343) (0.896) (0.638) (0.462) (0.203) (0.336) (0.742)
Tr · SNI -0.177 -5.066 -1.825* -15.22 0.270 -1.825 -1.226
(0.505) (0.113) (0.0503) (0.800) (0.279) (0.271) (0.312)
Constant 0.100 47.60*** 4.240*** 140.2*** 1.231*** 0.285* 5.410***
(0.242) (0.0001) (1.56e-08) (1.61e-07) (3.54e-07) (0.0731) (9.54e-10)
Observations 320 325 325 321 325 320 320
R-squared 0.011 0.017 0.022 0.015 0.029 0.006 0.023
F test p value 0.312 0.0613 0.0894 0.243 0.354 0.108 0.232
p-values in parentheses, standard errors clustered at village level
output and inputs in kgs per acre, education is years completed
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Balanced Panel Checks: Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES fertilizer age education yield used acreage pesticide seed
SNI 0.577 3.630 1.759*** 8.496 0.145 0.297 1.033
(0.259) (0.333) (0.00347) (0.830) (0.223) (0.213) (0.338)
TRAINING 0.00 1.182 1.833** 44.92 0.270** 0.0878*** 1.013
(0.0983) (0.623) (0.0130) (0.273) (0.0122) (0.00321) (0.220)
Tr · SNI -0.577 -6.427 -2.843** 2.114 -0.331* -0.366 -2.017
(0.259) (0.170) (0.0107) (0.974) (0.0506) (0.131) (0.118)
Constant 0.00 49.00*** 1.500*** 127.4*** 0.627*** 0.00 3.679***
(0.112) (0.00) (2.34e-05) (2.48e-10) (6.02e-10) (3.85e-06)
Observations 155 159 159 156 159 155 155
R-squared 0.032 0.020 0.041 0.010 0.032 0.055 0.034
F test p value 0.259 0.516 0.00883 0.362 0.0817 0.00613 0.380
p-values in parentheses, standard errors clustered at village level
output and inputs in kgs per acre, education is years completed































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Probit: Decision to Grow Cotton
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All yields yields less 400 yields less 400 M yields less 400 F
SNI 0.182* 0.256** 0.173 0.385***
(0.0725) (0.0108) (0.141) (0.00439)
TRAINING 0.109 0.128 0.0633 0.249**
(0.205) (0.144) (0.571) (0.0266)
Tr · SNI 0.0406 -0.0281 0.114 -0.205
(0.782) (0.858) (0.419) (0.342)
Observations 325 287 144 143
mean probability cultivated 0.723 0.714 0.743 0.685
p-values in parentheses, standard errors clustered at village level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Probit, Probability of Positive Yield for Planters in 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All yields yields less 400 yields less 400 M yields less 400 F
SNI 0.188** 0.195* 0.247*** 0.147
(0.0419) (0.0522) (0.00741) (0.279)
TRAINING 0.121 0.157 0.189** 0.117
(0.161) (0.111) (0.0117) (0.463)
Observations 235 205 107 98
mean probability harvested 0.804 0.785 0.813 0.755
p-values in parentheses, standard errors clustered at village level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
32
Table 9: Cross Sectional Impact of SNI on Yields
and Information Learned
(1) (2) (3)
MODELS Tobit OLS OLS
VARIABLES yield yield information learned
SNI 134.9** 51.06* 0.0601**
(0.0302) (0.0884) (0.0320)
TRAINING 105.1* 46.77* 0.0298
(0.0803) (0.0825) (0.218)
Tr · SNI -47.89 -6.737 -0.0444
(0.567) (0.875) (0.270)
Constant -96.42** 32.15** 0.380***
(0.0284) (0.0417) (0.00)
Observations 273 273 273
R-squared 0.072 0.024
mean 84.96 84.96 0.415
p-values in parentheses, standard errors clustered at village level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Impact of SNI on Yields,









Tr · SNI 77.25**
(0.0262)
SNI · t 108.4**
(0.0304)
TRAINING · t 73.01*
(0.0739)











p-values in parentheses, standard errors clustered at village level
Information indicates whether a women attended the information meeting.
Data include only females (no males were invited to the information meetings).




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12: OLS, Difference in Difference for Yields less than 400, Controlling for Imbalanced
Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Female Female Female Female Female
VARIABLES less than 400 less than 400 less than 400 less than 400 less than 400 less than 400 less than 400 less than 400 less than 400
t -82.94*** -83.12*** -82.94*** -83.12*** -100.5*** -100.5*** -104.7*** -100.5*** -104.7***
(0.00376) (0.00458) (0.00379) (0.00462) (0.000449) (0.000458) (0.00556) (0.000458) (0.00573)
SNI -2.305 -2.232 -15.44 -15.12 -54.07** -60.95** -69.67** -46.50* -66.81**
(0.928) (0.924) (0.549) (0.540) (0.0210) (0.0130) (0.0145) (0.0539) (0.0299)
TRAINING 15.68 15.25 6.990 6.884 -6.996 -12.86 -20.90 0.504 -14.21
(0.460) (0.442) (0.713) (0.708) (0.761) (0.578) (0.455) (0.984) (0.667)
Tr · SNI 24.21 21.35 42.58 40.41 64.76* 74.30* 77.42* 53.96 68.33
(0.442) (0.483) (0.178) (0.201) (0.0694) (0.0530) (0.0574) (0.142) (0.131)
SNI · t 80.89** 81.07** 80.89** 81.07** 98.28** 98.28** 109.6** 98.28** 109.6**
(0.0125) (0.0141) (0.0126) (0.0142) (0.0222) (0.0224) (0.0323) (0.0224) (0.0329)
TRAINING · t 82.28* 82.80* 82.31* 82.86* 72.16* 72.28* 83.72* 72.24* 84.18*
(0.0711) (0.0733) (0.0713) (0.0734) (0.0735) (0.0736) (0.0850) (0.0738) (0.0844)
Tr · SNI · t -47.82 -48.18 -47.93 -48.40 -54.40 -54.71 -63.35 -54.50 -64.21
(0.370) (0.371) (0.370) (0.370) (0.372) (0.371) (0.354) (0.372) (0.350)
age 0.749 0.391
(0.221) (0.480)
education 6.936*** 6.528** 3.502 4.405





Constant 107.1*** -1,362 83.75*** -680.2 127.4*** 122.4*** 148.3*** 134.2*** 166.9***
(7.55e-07) (0.256) (6.05e-05) (0.531) (4.11e-10) (4.71e-09) (2.73e-08) (1.22e-09) (3.37e-07)
Observations 574 570 574 570 286 286 250 286 250
R-squared 0.044 0.047 0.066 0.066 0.061 0.069 0.060 0.068 0.104
mean yield 123.7 123.7 123.7 123.7 108.8 108.8 108.8 108.8 108.8
p-values in parentheses, standard errors clustered at village level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Difference in Differences of Intervention on Yields, Wild Bootstrapped SEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS Less 400 OLS less 400 M OLS less 400 F
t -95.80 -82.94 -71.76 -100.5
0.115 0.255 0.135 0 .13
TRAINING 38.44 15.68 30.93 -6.996
0.405 0.545 0.385 0.765
TRAINING · t 65.18 82.28 97.83 72.16
0.19 0.15 0.12 0.115
SNI 69.42 -2.305 40.77 -54.07*
0.17 0.91 0.305 0.08
SNI · t -0.708 80.89 69.89 98.28*
0.96 0.1 0.145 0.075
Tr · SNI -26.68 24.21 -4.395 64.76*
0.695 0.425 0.975 0.09
Tr · SNI · t 27.85 -47.82 -41.85 -54.40
0.64 0.49 0.655 0.405
Constant 129.6*** 107.1*** 94.15 127.4***
(0.00) (0.00) 0.13 (0.00)
Observations 646 574 288 286
R-squared 0.046 0.044 0.056 0.061
mean yield 160.4 123.7 138.5 108.8
p-values in parentheses, standard errors clustered at village level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Main OLS Difference in Difference with Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All yields yields less 400 yields M less 400 yields F less 400
SNI 0.0938 80.89** 69.89 98.28**
(0.998) (0.0123) (0.106) (0.0215)
TRAINING 65.64 82.09* 97.83 71.81*
(0.152) (0.0708) (0.113) (0.0736)
Tr · SNI 29.41 -47.10 -41.85 -53.40
(0.569) (0.376) (0.580) (0.378)
year -95.80*** -82.94*** -71.76** -100.5***
(0.00338) (0.00369) (0.0284) (0.000425)
Constant 192,651*** 166,751*** 144,289** 202,052***
(0.00335) (0.00366) (0.0283) (0.000423)
Observations 646 574 288 286
R-squared 0.039 0.025 0.029 0.049
Number of hhdid 325 287 144 143
mean yield 160.4 123.7 138.5 108.8
p-values in parentheses, standard errors clustered at village level




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B Information points in Training and SNI
Appendix: Game Points
1. Ladybirds are good insects (show picture)
2. Spacing between rows is 75 cm (3 sheets long)
3. Spacing between plants is 30 cm long (1 sheet)
4. Only plant 3-5 seeds per hole
5. More than 2 seedlings in one place will reduce cotton yield
6. First weeding occurs between the 2nd and 3rd week after planting
7. Second weeding occurs between the 6th and 10th week after planting
8. Bollworm (show picture) larvae appears between the 8th and 9th week after planting
9. Check germination after 5 days-replants seeds at gaps to get even crop cover
10. Prepare land several weeks in advance for cotton planting
11. Cotton is good for mixed and rotational crop
12. Use pesticide 5th to 7th week after planting for Lygus bug (show picture)
13. Use pesticide 8th to 9th week after planting for Bollworm (show picture)
14. Always cover hands and mouth when spraying pesticides
C Appendix: Model
To demonstrate our hypothesis that weak ties can improve yields, we use a simple modification to
the standard target-input learning model [Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995, Jovanovic and Nyarko,
1996]. Households in this setting are growing cotton without the benefit of significant previous
experience due to the interruption caused by civil war. We expect households to learn by doing
(learning from their own experiences) as well as from the experiences of others in their community
or from agricultural extension agents. Female-headed households experience lower yields in part
because they have fewer opportunities to learn from others, and they may not be able to take
full advantage of the training offered by extension officers. In particular, women may have fewer
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weak ties than men because their networks are more geographically concentrated and search
costs for valuable ties may therefore be higher.
The conventional exposition of the target-input model focuses on the choice of input levels
(such as fertilizer). However, in the Uganda setting, the greatest opportunities for learning are
on issues of timing. Fertilizers are not generally used in cotton farming in this setting. Farmers
are learning when to prepare, plant, thin, weed, apply pesticides, and harvest.21 The farmer
chooses an input level (or, in our case, a time to apply inputs), θit, in order to maximize profits
(see appendix D for more detailed exposition of this model). Profits are larger when the farmer’s
timing is closer to the ideal timing for a particular field in a particular year, τit. Profit q for
farmer i in period t is
qit = 1− (θit − τit)2 (3)
τit, the correct timing or input, is a normally distributed random variable (τit = τ
? + µit :
µ ∼ N(0, σ2τ )). The most profitable choice of timing or input is τit, but this is unknown and
therefore, the farmer will seek to maximize profit by learning and then choosing τ?. After
choosing the timing, given the best available information, the farmer can observe the output and
infer what the correct timing would have been for that time period. The farmer uses this noisy
observation of τ? to update his or her beliefs over τ? from θt to θt+1.
22 In the next period the
farmer will choose the expectation of the posterior distribution as the new input level in period
t+ 1.
The precision of the farmer’s estimate of the target improves as the farmer observes more
outcomes and updates the estimate with each new outcome. Denoting the number of outcomes
observed at time t as St−1 the variance of the farmer’s estimate is derived from straightforward





21The monitoring reports from trainers in the TR intervention contain information on what farmers said they spoke
about to other farmers. The most commonly reported conversations are focused on timing issues. Farmers complain
about inadequate access to pesticides and fertilizers but they do not talk about application levels [see Conley and Udry,
2010, for more about typical farmer information exchanges].
22In the pure target-input model, farmers observe τ directly, as a type of signal. Here we suggest that they infer it.
The difference is that mathematical inference only gives us τit = θit ±
√
1− qit. However, by assuming farmers have
access to some additional information that allows them to know if their guess is above or below the optional level, these
two views of a signal are formally identical.
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where ρθt=0 is the precision (inverse of the variance) of a farmer’s estimate in the initial period
and ρτ is the precision of the observations of the target timing (ρτ =
1
σ2τ
). The expected ouput
(Et(qit) = 1− σ2θt − σ2τ ) depends on the variance of the ex ante best timing (σ2τ ), which does not
change over time and the variance of the farmer’s estimate (σ2θt), which falls over time, resulting
in increased expected profits.
In the target input model, farmers do not experiment on their own plots for two key reasons.
First, choosing any timing that is not the best guess of the target timing results in lower expected
production. Thus, there is significant cost to experimentation. Second, different timing of actions
does not provide new information: there is only one informative signal per plot.23 Experimenting
within the plot does not provide new information but if the farmer can observe the choices of other
farmers, that information can be used to update to her beliefs on the optimal timing. Assume that
the farmer can observe or infer her neighbor’s signal τ in period t, plus some additional reporting
noise ξ(τj = τ







where σ2τ is the variance of the state of nature and σ
2
ξ is the variance of the observation of one’s
neighbors signal. The variance of the farmer’s guess evolves as follows:
σ2θt =
1
ρθt=0 + ρτSt−1 + ρνNt−1
(5)
where Nt−1 is the total number of trials of other farmers observed at period t. Expected output
is now a function of learning by doing (St) and learning from others (Nt).
24
However, if a farmer cannot learn more by subdividing her plot, why does she learn from the
experience of a neighbor whose plot is adjacent to hers? In particular, the experiences (signals)
within one plot are likely to be correlated with the experiences of neighboring plots. Nearby plots
are likely to suffer from highly correlated weather and pest events [in particular, pest spillovers:
see Harper and Zilberman, 1989, Regev et al., 1976] meaning the signals received on two such
plots are also correlated. To formalize this idea, assume that farmer i observes farmer j’s signal
and that the new signal is correlated to farmer i’s signal as described by γij . Formally, the
23µit is identical across the whole plot, so while varying θit across the plot changes qit, it does not provide new
information. Dividing the plot gives multiple observations of one draw from a random variable, not multiple draws.
24Foster and Rosenzweig [1995] assume learning depends not on the number of neighbors but the hectares planted.
Since hectares planted is not evolving in our model or data, we use the simplifying assumption that one farmer equals
one observation.
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farmers sees a signal which is a weighted sum of her own signal and another, independent signal
(τj = γij(τ
? + µj) + (1 − γij)τi + ξij). The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1] gives a measure of the spatial
independence of states of nature over two plots where γij = 1 means the states of nature are
uncorrelated and γij = 0 means they are perfectly correlated.











ij . Thus, the precision of a neighbor’s signal is decreasing in the
variance of the additional noise (increasing in the fidelity) σ2ξ and increasing the independence
of the signal γij .
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The variance of the farmer’s guess now evolves in the following manner (where J is the set of
possible network links and φξ is the fidelity of a neighbor’s signal, the inverse of the variance):
σ2θ =
1











Et(qit) = 1− σ2θt − σ2τ (7)




























In other words, network links with greater independence (γ) and fidelity (ξ) are more useful
on average, and increasing the fidelity for a particular link j is less useful for farmers who have
already had the opportunity to learn (larger S), have otherwise better networks (larger N−J),
have a more precise prior about the correct timing of activities (greater ρθt=0) and that increasing
25Munshi [2004] generates variability in the usefulness of a neighbor’s information by assuming farmer characteristics
are heterogeneous; different farmers may be seeking different target input levels. In our specification, there is only one
target input level, but nearby neighbors provide less unique information.
26Note that when γ is zero, we have the same result as a farmer subdividing her own plot: nothing will be learned.
When γ is one, we have the standard learning result as above: the precision of a neighbor’s signal is a function of the
underlying variance of the state of nature and the variance that results from the noise in translating signals.
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the fidelity of a particular signal is more useful for links that have greater independence (greater
γij).
Uncorrelated signals are useful for farmers because they provide a more precise signal of
the optimal timing. Stronger network links, such as with nearby neighbors, imply more precise
information flows but, following the intuition of Granovetter [1974], it may be that weaker links
provide signals with greater independence and therefore information.
D Derivations
Definitions of terms:




). The signal and the prior are combined to create the posterior:



















Introducing the notation for the precision ρ = 1
σ2
we can rewrite these as


















, where St−1 is the
number of observations of neighbor’s signals at time t− 1.
When the farmer also observes the signals from other farmers j, τijt = τjt+ξ. The variance of




ξ and finally combining own learning with learning from others, the
variance of the prior evolves as follows: σ2θt =
1
ρθt=0+St−1∗ρτ+Nt−1∗ρν
where Nt−1 is the number of
neighbor’s signals observed at time t− 1.
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Now assume that signals between two farmers i and j are correlated in the following fashion:
τi = τ
? + µi (8)
τj = γij(τ
? + µj) + (1− γij)τi + ξij (9)
Essentially the signal from a neighbor is a weighted sum of the farmer’s own signal, an un-
correlated (informative) signal and the standard noise associated with observing someone else’s
signal. However, the farmer knows γij and observes her own signal and can use this information
to recover the uncorrelated (informative signal) from the observed signal.
τj − τi(1− γij)
γij









. In other words, although the farmer can
extract an unbiased uncorrelated signal, the noise associated with this signal is greater than the
noise associated with the pure uncorrelated signal and this noise is a function of the correlation
between the two signals. Note that where γ = 1 we have the same uncorrelated signal as before
and when γ = 0 we have a completely uninformative signal (with infinite variance). In general,
because γ ∈ (0, 1], the error associated with this signal is greater than the error associated with
an uncorrelated signal: σ2µ + σ
2
ξij
< σ2µ +
σ2ξij
γ2ij
.
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